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1.1  Introduction 
“Merger mania”  is  sweeping the  health  care industry. Hospitals  are 
merging with other hospitals. Hospitals are purchasing or merging with 
physician practices. Insurers are merging with  other  insurers. Why are 
these consolidations occurring? What are their implications for consum- 
ers, employers, and the government? In this paper we start to address these 
questions. Because so little is known about health care consolidation, we 
focus on consolidation in a particular state-Massachusetts-and  largely 
on the hospital sector. Hospital consolidation in Massachusetts has been 
as rapid as anywhere in the country. Between 1980 and 1996, two-thirds 
of the state’s 108 acute care hospitals were involved in some type of merger 
or contractual affiliation, as were many physicians and a number of insur- 
ers. We  analyze the Massachusetts experience using standard economic 
tools as well as a set of interviews of virtually all of the major hospitals in 
the  Boston area. Our results cannot be  generalized to the nation  as a 
whole, but they do tell us about consolidation in a situation where it has 
been pervasive. 
The fundamental factor driving health care consolidation, we argue, is 
managed care. Traditional health  insurance was very  generous. It paid 
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providers on a fee-for-service basis; it did little to control utilization; and 
it allowed patients unlimited access to the providers of their choice. Man- 
aged care changes all that. Managed care policies typically pay  primary 
care physicians a fixed  amount per enrollee (“capitation”), making the 
provider bear all of the marginal cost of services. They require patients to 
see a primary care physician (“gatekeeper”) before getting a referral to a 
specialist. And they set up a network of “preferred” providers (physicians, 
hospitals, and pharmaceutical  companies) who accept much lower fees 
from insurers in exchange for having access to the insurance pool. More 
generally, this phenomenon of an exogenous shock by health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs) causing a consolidation wave  is  not necessarily 
unique to the hospital industry. The defense industry in recent years prob- 
ably fits this model as well. 
Managed  care  has  spurred  provider  consolidation  in  three  primary 
ways. The first effect we  term consolidation for closure. Managed care- 
along with technological innovation in medicine more generally-has  re- 
duced the demand for inpatient hospitals substantially. Between 1980 and 
1994, admissions to Massachusetts hospitals fell by  0.8 percent annually 
and inpatient days fell by 3.5 percent annually. By any assessment, hospital 
capacity in Massachusetts (and the nation as a whole) was substantially 
above demand. Some hospitals have closed outright, while others have 
merged to facilitate, or substitute for, closure. 
The second effect we  term consolidation for  economies of  scale. Access 
to managed care networks is guaranteed largely on the basis of cost. Low 
cost providers will be better positioned to join networks than high cost 
providers. In many cases, overall costs can be lowered through hospital 
mergers. Fixed costs of administrative services, laboratories, or specialized 
clinical facilities, for example, require a minimum  scale to be  efficient. 
Particularly as hospital admissions fall, mergers to achieve these econo- 
mies of scale have become more common. 
The third effect we  term consolidation for network creation. The cottage 
industry of local hospitals and physicians in each town is giving way to 
the regionalization of medical care. To improve their bargaining position 
with insurers, hospitals want to be part of bigger networks. To ensure ac- 
cess to patients, hospitals want to affiliate with primary care physicians 
and hospitals in outlying areas. The medical market is moving toward a 
position  of large provider networks, potentially  three to five  in major 
cities, that consist of  hospitals, primary care physicians, and specialist 
groups. 
In the remainder of  the paper, we  document the role of  health  care 
consolidation in closures, economies of scale, and network creation and 
consider the implications of mergers for health care costs and patient out- 
comes. We  begin in  section 1.2 with a discussion of the terminology of 
consolidation. In section 1.3 we  discuss the growth of managed care and Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace in Massachusetts  11 
show trends in patient care. Section 1.4 discusses the rationales for consol- 
idation. Section 1.5 shows aggregate trends in consolidation in Massachu- 
setts, and section 1.6 presents a series of case studies. Section 1.7 looks at 
some of  the implications of mergers for medical care costs. Section 1.8 
concludes. 
1.2  Definition of Terms 
Hospital consolidations encompasses a range of different factors. Be- 
cause health care is so local-a  laboratory three blocks away is practically 
useless for an emergency patient-not  all consolidations can involve the 
same changes. We differentiate consolidations along three lines. 
The first type of consolidation is an agreement to coordinate on medical 
treatments. For example, two hospitals can set up a joint seminar to learn 
about patient care or can agree to transfer patients back and forth in a 
specified way. This type of consolidation is not our primary concern. 
The second type of consolidation is an agreement to negotiate jointly 
with third parties. For example, hospitals might agree to purchase inputs 
together or to negotiate together with insurers. This type of consolidation 
was contemplated in Boston before mergers became widespread. 
Neither of these first two types of consolidation involves the combina- 
tion of production activities. Perhaps the most extreme form of consolida- 
tion is  the complete closure of a medical facility, with all of its services 
being consolidated into other hospitals. We  define a closure as an acute 
care facility’s closing or converting such that it is no longer an acute care 
facility. “Acute care” means a general medical and surgical hospital as 
defined by the American Hospital Association. A conversion would be if 
an acute care facility became a rehabilitation center or an elderly care 
facility, and conversions as well  as situations where the building is  no 
longer used in the medical care industry are all considered to be closures. 
There are many situations where there is a partial combination of ser- 
vices between facilities with all involved facilities remaining open. We de- 
fine a merger as a consolidation of at least some aspects of hospital pro- 
duction. Mergers can occur at several different levels. The easiest type of 
merger is an administrative merger. This involves combining the nonpatient 
aspects of the hospitals-billing,  information services, purchasing, facili- 
ties and maintenance, and so forth. 
Administrative mergers are relatively easy because there is no need for 
the hospitals to be physically close to one another. If the hospitals are 
close in proximity, they can merge along several other dimensions: ancil- 
lary services such as laboratories, x-ray  machines, magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI), and so forth; nursing stafJ; and clinical services such as 
medicahrgical units, emergency rooms, and obstetrics units. 
The degree to which these services can be merged depends on the exact 12  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
physical structure of the hospitals. Services such as organ transplantation 
or obstetrics can be combined at one institution even if the hospitals are 
several miles apart, since there is typically sufficient time to move patients 
back and forth between institutions. Core services such as laboratories or 
radiology cannot be  far apart from general medical and surgical units, 
however. 
Very few mergers involve full integration of two hospitals into one facil- 
ity, although many merged institutions claim they intend to move toward 
this type of integration. Determining the implications of  steps short of 
full integration is extremely important and is a subject we  pay close atten- 
tion to. 
To get a sense for what economies of scale are possible, table 1.1 shows 
a breakdown of hospital employees by type in 1988. The average hospital 
had roughly one thousand employees, of which close to one-half were not 
involved with patient care (laundry, cafeteria, custodial staffs, etc.), an- 
other third were  nurses, and the residual were  administrators, technical 
workers and physicians. Economies of scale seem quite possible. An aver- 
age hospital had a total budget of $100 million in 1994, of which approx- 
imately 50 percent came from labor expenses. If a hospital could cut  10 
percent of  its labor force, it would save approximately 5 percent of  total 
spending. 
1.3  Trends in the Medical Care Industry 
Before considering health care consolidation, we  begin with a discus- 
sion of the changes that are taking place in the delivery of medical services 
and health insurance. Traditional insurance was very generous for provid- 
ers. Reimbursement was on a fee-for-service basis, so that every additional 
test or procedure brought in additional income. Providers had complete 
say about what treatments they thought were appropriate, with few con- 
trols on utilization. And  patients paid very  little at the time they used 
services, giving them little incentive to monitor the care they received. 
The result was an industry that expanded far beyond the level of truly 
necessary services. The expansion was in two directions. First, specialist 
care became dominant over primary care. Why see an internist for chest 
pains when a cardiologist is around and can be seen at little additional 
cost? Since specialists tend to perform procedures related to their specialty 
more frequently than do generalists seeing similar patients (Greenfield et 
al. 1992), the result was high levels and rapid growth of medical services. 
In addition, hospitalizations became frequent and lengthy. Marginal cases 
were  generally hospitalized, and people admitted to hospitals tended to 
stay there for long periods of time to make sure everything was OK. 
Further,  because health  care is  primarily a local good, the industry 
developed  a  local  orientation.  Practically every  community had  local Table 1.1  Distribution of Hospital Employment, 1988 
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physicians and hospitals, which were the entry points to the medical sys- 
tem along with specialized, high-tech hospitals in  big cities. Figure 1.1 
shows the distribution of acute care hospitals in Massachusetts in  1980- 
a year roughly at the high-water mark for the hospital industry. Each dot 
in the figure is an acute care hospital.' There were  108 acute care hospitals 
in 1980. Many towns had one or two community hospitals or were near a 
town that had one. The map also indicates which of the 1980 acute care 
hospitals are no longer acute care hospitals today. The smaller symbols 
indicate that the hospital closed before 1996. 
We  divide the hospitals in the state into five groups (differentiated on 
the map): 24 hospitals were located in major cities;2  53 hospitals in subur- 
ban areas immediately surrounding  these major  citie~;~  12 hospitals in 
smaller cities;4  12 hospitals in suburbs of these smaller cities; and 7 hospi- 
tals in rural areas. 
Because towns took great pride in their hospitals, and hospitals were 
such an important local institution, medical cultures developed quite lo- 
cally. Patients and physicians in  neighboring towns or across the street 
might each see their hospital as the better institution. The most difficult 
aspect of hospital mergers, in many cases, are these cultural issues. 
The past few years have seen a dramatic reversal of  these trends (see 
Zelman 1996 for an overview). Most prominent in the reversal is the rise 
of  managed care insurance.s One fundamental difference between man- 
aged care and traditional insurance is that managed care insurers generally 
do not pay providers on a fee-for-service basis. Primary care physicians, 
for example, are typically capitated-they  receive a fixed amount per pa- 
tient per month, independent of actual services provided. Hospitals and 
specialists are generally paid on a fee-for-service basis, but there are often 
financial incentives facing the specialist and the primary care physician to 
encourage lower utilization. For example, primary care physicians might 
get additional income if  hospital utilization rates remain low, or hospital 
payments could depend on utilization rates. As a result, there are substan- 
tial incentives toward reduced utilization of medical care, particularly hos- 
pital and specialist care (Cutler 1995). 
I. Acute care means that the hospital is a general medical or surgical hospital, as defined 
by  the American Hospital Association. The primary medical institutions excluded by  this 
definition are psychiatric and rehabilitation hospitals. 
2. Major cities are Boston, Springfield, and Worcester. 
3. We  define a suburb loosely as a town near a city. Large towns near larger cities are 
considered suburbs rather than their own city. For example, Cambridge is considered a sub- 
urb of Boston. 
4.  The smaller cities are Lawrence, Lowell, New Bedford, Fall River, FitchburglLeomin- 
ster, and Pittsfield. 
5. The lexicon of managed care has traditionally been divided into such terms as health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and indepen- 
dent practice associations (IPAs). but for our purposes the terminology is less important 
than the economic effects. 16  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
Financial pressures are not limited to private insurance but have be- 
come most  extensive there. Beginning in  fiscal year  1984, for example, 
Medicare moved to paying hospitals on a per-case basis, much the way 
managed care does now. Medicaid followed as well, and managed care is 
an increasing part of both of these programs. But the dominant effect for 
providers has been managed care in the private sector. 
In addition to its financial restrictions, managed care removes equal 
choice of providers. Managed care insurers set up a “network” of pro- 
viders who agree to lower fees in exchange for access to the network. Pa- 
tients are steered toward the network providers by increasing the cost shar- 
ing required for out-of-network usage. A typical plan, for example, might 
charge a ten dollar copayment if the person uses a network provider but 
require a five hundred dollar deductible and 20 percent coinsurance for 
care received outside of the network. 
Even within the network, moreover, patients do not have free choice of 
providers. Most managed care insurers use the primary care physician as 
a “gatekeeper”-care  from specialists will only be available if the primary 
care physician has authorized it. Limiting access to medical specialists 
limits the use of expensive, high-tech medical care. 
Finally, managed care insurers bargain strenuously with providers. Be- 
cause access to the network is so important and managed care limits the 
network substantially, managed care insurers receive rates far below what 
non-managed care insurers are paying. No systematic evidence on pay- 
ment rates across insurers is available, but our informal conversations sug- 
gest that a large managed care insurer can pay up to 30 percent below in- 
surers without a tight network. 
Managed care is a large and growing part of the health insurance mar- 
ketplace (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse  1996). Figure  1.2 shows the 
expansion of managed care into Massachusetts and the nation as a whole 
between 1984 and 1994. The figure shows just one part of managed care- 
closed panel HMO enrollment. Other types of insurance such as preferred 
provider organizations (PPOs) and looser forms of HMOs do not have 
data that extend back as far. Even with this restriction, more than a third 
(34.5 percent) of the Massachusetts population was enrolled in an HMO 
in 1994. This is triple the rate a decade earlier and over twice the national 
average. Massachusetts thus seems to be a natural case study for examin- 
ing the impact of managed care on the medical marketplace. 
1.4  Trends in the Hospital Marketplace 
Managed care is not the only factor affecting the hospital marketplace, 
although it is a dominant one. The movement of Medicare and Medicaid 
to a per-admission payment basis reduced the intensity of medical treat- 
ment substantially (Feder, Hadley, and Zuckerman 1987). And technologi- Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace in Massachusetts  17 
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cal change has also reduced the demand for inpatient care. In the early 
1980s, for example, the typical cataract surgery operation involved several 
days in the hospital. By  the late 1980s, essentially all cataract surgeries 
were  done on an outpatient basis. Treatment of  ulcers used  to require 
surgery, but better knowledge of gastrointestinal processes has led to the 
development of  pharmaceutical methods of treatment. The net effect  of 
all of these factors has been a substantial reduction in the demand for 
inpatient hospitals. 
The demand reduction has been dramatic. Figure 1.3 shows the trend 
in inpatient days in Massachusetts hospitals. Between 1980 and 1994, in- 18  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
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patient days have declined by  3.5 percent annually, even with a growing 
and aging population. This decline is so dramatic that by the turn of the 
century, inpatient hospital utilization will be roughly 50 percent of its level 
in  1980. Indeed, a common estimate among market participants is that 
long-run demand will be 50 percent or less of its peak level. 
Figure 1.4 decomposes the change in inpatient days into changes in the 
number of admissions and changes in the length of stay per admission. 
Both have fallen over time. Admissions fell by  1.1 percent annually be- 
tween 1980 and 1994, and length of stay fell by 2.2 percent annually. The 
reduction in average length of stay is particularly notable since most re- 
search suggests that  the pool of  patients being admitted to hospitals is 
sicker now than it used to be (Cutler and Staiger 1996). Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace in Massachusetts  19 
The reduction in inpatient demand has had three implications for the 
organization of the medical system. 
1.4.1  Consolidation for Closure 
Clearly, demand reductions of this magnitude cannot be met without 
substantial hospital closures and downsizing of surviving hospitals. The 
first implication of managed care has therefore been to force a contraction 
of inpatient beds. We term this implication consolidation for closure. 
Some hospitals have closed outright. Smaller hospitals without strong 
ties to particular local communities, for example, are generally the first to 
close. Figure 1.5 shows the drop in the number of acute care hospitals in 
Massachusetts. 
But it is often difficult for hospitals to close. The community and cul- 
tural factors noted above make people want to preserve their access to 
nearby, neighborhood  health  care and make providers eager to ensure 
continuity of this access. In such circumstances, hospital mergers are often 
a way to facilitate, or substitute for, closure. For instance, for a community 
that has had two hospitals but now only needs one, merging may make it 
easier for the combined institution to shut down one of the physical build- 
ings and move operations to the other. The building may move out of the 
medical sector entirely (as happened in Lynn, where the old hospital was 
razed and converted into a supermarket). Or the facility may be converted 
into a psychiatric hospital,  rehabilitation hospital,  nursing home, out- 
patient center, or similar service (as happened in Winthrop where Boston 
University Medical Center purchased Winthrop Community Hospital and 
converted it into an outpatient facility). 
70 
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Alternatively, merging hospitals can reduce the inpatient supply of each 
hospital but maintain both physical institutions as acute care facilities. 
This is what occurred in Framingham and Natick, where both local hospi- 
tals remain open but at substantially lower capacity than before. 
A reduction in hospital beds has indeed occurred. Figure 1.6 shows the 
number of acute care hospital beds from 1980 to 1994. Inpatient capacity 
has fallen by  30 percent. This is near the reduction in hospital days, al- 
though a bit smaller. It seems that further facility closure will be needed. 
Managed care penetration varies considerably across different states, 
and one may therefore expect consolidation  for closure to differ across 
states as well. Indeed, California, which along with  Massachusetts has 
high managed care penetration, has also seen a large number of hospital 
closings and consolidations. In future research, we intend to examine how 
much of hospital closings nationwide results from managed care. 
1.4.2 
The second implication of managed care is to increase the emphasis on 
cost savings. In addition to closing or curtailing services, hospitals have 
incentives to provide care more efficiently. Mergers can help hospitals real- 
ize efficiency savings. This is particularly true as demand is falling. A hos- 
pital that was producing at minimum cost with four hundred beds may be 
above minimum cost if it falls to two hundred beds. In order to reduce av- 
erage costs, the hospital may need to merge. We term this rationale consoli- 
dation for economies of  scale. 
As noted  above, hospitals can merge at several levels. Hospitals can 
combine  their  administrations, their  ancillary  services (laboratories,  x- 
rays, etc.), nursing services, and their  entire medical services. The ease 
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with which hospitals can combine each of these levels decreases after ad- 
ministrative and ancillary, and increases as the distance between the hospi- 
tals becomes smaller. Hospitals that are not located next to each other 
cannot share certain facilities such as laboratories or cafeterias. Recent 
mergers have run the gamut of these possibilities. 
1.4.3  Consolidation for Network Creation 
The third  implication of  managed care is  somewhat more subtle. As 
managed care has increased in  importance, the value of being part of a 
larger network has increased as well. 
Networking regionally meets two needs. First, it is a way to secure ac- 
cess to patients in a market with falling demand. Patients are generally 
not loyal to insurance companies (other than the government), but they 
are very loyal to their doctor (witness the advertising on television and ra- 
dio). Given that hospitals need patients, that patients value stable provider 
contacts,  and  that  patients  are increasingly  affiliating themselves with 
primary care physicians, the key to ensuring a continuous stream of pa- 
tients is  to affiliate with primary  care physicians. Hospitals’ buying or 
affiliating with primary care practices or community hospitals to meet this 
demand has become a substantial market. 
Specialists are less well positioned than are primary care physicians in 
this market, in part because specialists have much higher costs than pri- 
mary care physicians, and in part because the relative supply of specialists 
is so much greater than the relative supply of primary care physicians. 
Thus, affiliations between hospitals and specialists are a much smaller part 
of the managed care revolution. 
Networks also increase the bargaining power of  providers relative to 
insurers. For small hospitals, the reality is that managed care insurers will 
not even bother to contract with a small hospital that does not offer the 
full range of  services. As a merged institution, two small hospitals can 
offer a complete medical package to insurers that the two separately might 
not be able to support. 
Large hospitals can also gain by merging. Even large hospitals face price 
pressure from insurers. If hospitals can affiliate with enough other hospi- 
tals so that an insurance company could not conceivably offer a plan to 
its customers without access to those hospitals, then the balance of power 
shifts toward the hospitals and the contracts become more favorable. 
1.5  The Massachusetts Experience 
To examine how these various trends have played out, we  look in detail 
at the recent history of consolidation in Massachusetts. Our data on con- 
solidation and its outcomes are from the Massachusetts Hospital Associa- 
tion and the American Hospital Association. 
Table  1.2  shows  the  number  of  hospitals  involved  in  at  least  one Table 1.2  Hospital Consolidation in Massachusetts 
Consolidations 
Merged 
Number of Hospitals  Closed,  Immediate  Future  Still  Hospitals without 
Years  Beginning  No Merger  C  1  o  s  u r  e  Closure  Acute Care  Consolidation 
1980-85  108 
1985-90  104 
1990-92  93 
1992-94  91 
1994-96  87 
Total  108 
3  1  2  8 
5  4  1  11 
0  1  0  8 
0  4  0  18 
0  0  0  11 
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consolidation over time. We  divide consolidations into two broad types: 
closures without any prior affiliation with another hospital and mergers.6 
A merger need not be the end of the story. We subdivide mergers by what 
happened to the original hospital building: immediate closure, closure in 
the future, or survival as an acute care institution. 
Closure has been an important part of hospital consolidation. Of  the 
108 acute care facilities in Massachusetts in  1980, 8 closed without any 
prior consolidation activity, and 13 closed subsequent to a merger. Thus, 
there has been a net reduction of 20  percent (21/108) in the number of 
acute care hospitals. Three-quarters of the hospitals that have closed either 
closed or first merged with another hospital in the 1980s. This fact suggests 
that there were stronger and weaker hospitals in 1980, and that the first ef- 
fect of falling demand is to force the weaker institutions to leave the market. 
In addition to the hospitals that closed, another 56 hospitals merged 
with another institution and remain open as inpatient facilities. This type 
of consolidation has increased over time, from roughly 2 per year in the 
1980s to 6 per year in the 1990s. Nearly all of the mergers of large hospitals 
are later in the period (Partners, CareGroup, ColumbidHCA). 
All  told, 69 percent of  the hospitals in  Massachusetts have closed or 
been involved in some kind of consolidation since 1980; only 31 institu- 
tions have neither closed nor merged with another hospital (and many of 
these are the subject of consolidation rumors). 
The extent of  consolidation,  and the form  that consolidation  takes, 
differs along two dimensions. The first is the hospital’s location within the 
state. The upper panel of table 1.3 shows the rate of consolidation by hos- 
pital location. Consolidation is more common in cities than in suburbs or 
rural areas. Seventy-five percent of big city hospitals and 83 percent of 
small city hospitals have engaged in some consolidation, compared to 60 
or 70 percent of other hospitals. 
The form of consolidation differs as well.  Closure-whether  coupled 
with a merger or not-is  more common in big cities or their suburbs than 
in other areas of the state. In big cities and their suburbs, 21 percent of the 
hospitals in 1980 ultimately closed, compared to 16 percent of hospitals in 
other areas. Merger without closure, in contrast, is about equally likely in 
all of the areas. 
The second dimension is the size of the institution. The lower panel of 
table  1.3 shows the rate of  consolidation by  the number of beds in the 
hospital in  1980. Smaller facilities are much more likely to consolidate 
than are larger facilities. Eighty percent of  hospitals with less than one 
hundred beds underwent some form of consolidation, compared with 67 
percent of large hospitals. The biggest difference is in the likelihood that 
6.  Mergers are sometimes differentiated into holding company mergers, acquisitions, and 
contractual arrangements, but we do not view this distinction as particularly relevant. 24  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
Table 1.3  Consolidation by Hospital Location and Number of Beds 
Percent  Number of 
Hospitals,  Percent  Percent  Merging 




Suburb of big city 
Small city 
Suburb of small city 
Rural 
Number of beds, 1980 
Less than 100 beds 
100-300  beds 
More than 300 beds 
108  71 
24  75 
53  68 
12  83 
12  67 
7  71 
25  80 
56  70 
27  67 
19  52 
21  54 
21  47 
8  75 
25  42 
14  57 
52  28 
10  59 
7  59 
Note; Big cities are Boston, Springfield, and Worcester. Small cities are Lawrence, Lowell, New Bed- 
ford, Fall River, Fitchburg/Leominster, and Pittsfield. Suburbs are generally defined as towns in close 
proximity to large cities. Small cities very close to large cities are considered suburbs, rather than their 
own city (e.g., Cambridge is a suburb of Boston). Fig. 1.1 shows the distribution of hospitals by  lo- 
cation. 
a hospital will close. Over half of the small hospitals in Massachusetts in 
1980 were no longer acute care facilities by  1996. Hospitals with less than 
one hundred beds in 1980 accounted for approximately one-fourth of the 
acute care hospitals, and yet  62 percent of the closures came from that 
group. 
But the downsizing of the industry is more than just hospitals closing. 
As table 1.4 shows, even those hospitals that are still acute care institutions 
have seen reductions in  the number of  inpatient  beds. Both those that 
consolidated and those that did not consolidate have reduced their in- 
patient beds by roughly 20 percent. As the last row of the table shows, only 
one-third of the reduction in inpatient beds has been a result of hospital 
closures; the remaining two-thirds represents downsizing among existing 
institutions. 
A hospital involves a certain amount of physical space, and one might 
wonder what hospitals do with the space when it is no longer in use serving 
acute care patients. Table 1.5 presents data on this question. Generally, 
areas of the hospital that are no longer in use for acute patients are con- 
verted to subacute use-rehabilitation  facilities, nursing home services, 
and psychiatric services. Between 1980 and 1994 the share of beds in acute 
care facilities that were  rehabilitation beds rose from 0.3 percent to 1.1 
percent, while nursing home beds and psychiatric beds rose even more 
substantially, from 0.2 to 4.3 percent and 0.3 to 7.2 percent, respectively. 
The shift of acute care institutions to subacute care services is one of the 
hallmarks of hospital consolidation. Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace in Massachusetts  25 
Table 1.4  Change in Average Number of Beds by Hospital Location and 
Consolidation 
Consolidation 
Still  No 
Location  Year  Closed  Acute Care  Consolidation  Average 
Big city  1980 
1994 
Suburb of big city  1980 
1994 
Small city  1980 
1994 
Suburb of small city  1980 
1994 










































-21  -  22  -  10  Average change (YO)  - 
YO  of total change  35  44  21  100 
Nore; Location definitions are given in table 1.3. 
Have these mergers been largely for closure, economies of scale, or net- 
work creation? It is difficult to say ex ante, and more than one may be at 
work in any particular case. We can give some sense of this by  looking at 
the extremes. Given the reduction in the number of hospitals, consolida- 
tion for closure seems quite important. So does consolidation for econom- 
ics of scale. In several mergers, the two hospitals were physically joined. 
But these are only crude estimates. We  try to get a better sense of why 
some hospitals are merging in the next section by  analyzing a series of 
case studies. 
1.6  Case Studies 
In this section, we  consider how some of the mergers that have occurred 
in Massachusetts fit into our typology above. We focus on five mergers in 
particular, which are detailed in table 1.6: (1) the merger of Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital and Massachusetts General Hospital to form Partners 
Health Care (1993); (2) the merger of Beth Israel Hospital, the Pathways 
Group (build around the Deaconess), and  Mount Auburn Hospital  to 
form CareGroup (1994 and 1996); (3) the merger of Boston City Hospital 
and  the  Boston  University  Hospital  to form  Boston  Medical  Center 
(1996);  (4)  the  merger  of  Framingham  Union  Hospital  and  Leonard 
Morse Hospital to form MetroWest (1991), and its subsequent acquisition 
by  the  for-profit ColumbidHCA  chain  (1996); and  (5)  the  merger  of 
Union Hospital and Lynn Hospital to form AtlantiCare (1985). 
We  chose these mergers because we  felt they represent a good cross Table 1.5  Distribution of Hospital Beds by  Type of Bed and Institution 
Location 
Non-Acute  Care Services 
Nursing  Other 
Year  Total  Rehabilitation  Home  Psychiatric  Subacute 
Acute care institutions  1980  25,005  65  50  64  77 
1994  19,914  215  813  1,364  296 
Percent of acute care  1980  -~  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3 
beds  1994  -  1.1  4.3  7.2  1.5 
Note: Acute care institutions are defined as general medical and surgical facilities by the American Hospital Association Table 1.6  Summary of Consolidation Case Studies 
Number of Beds 
Consolidation  Year  1980  1994  Type  Rationale 
Partners (Boston) 
Massachusetts General Hospital 











Boston Medical Center (Boston) 
Boston City Hospital 
















1,092  899 
655  712 
1,747  1,611 
452  447 
489  314 
300  279 
245  173 
31 1  206 
102  59 
101  58 
2,000  1,536 
Full integration (BIIDeaconess) 
Single parent (Others) 
Full integration 
454  282 
379  31 1 
833  593 
311  469 
259 
570  469 
210  318 
305 
515  318 




Economies of scale (administration) 
Economies of scale 
Network formation 
Closure 
Economies of scale 
Closure 
Network formation 
Economies of scale 
Closure 
Access to capital 
Debt relief 
Closure 
Economies of scale 
Debt relief 
Note: Rationale for merger drawn from hospital interviews. 28  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
section of  the different types of consolidations occurring in the Boston 
area. Partners  and CareGroup  are large health  care networks. Boston 
Medical Center brings a concern about public hospitals and the implica- 
tions for the poor. AtlantiCare and MetroWest are smaller suburban hos- 
pitals, where survival is more of a concern. 
Our analysis is based on both economic evidence and detailed inter- 
views with hospital executives from all of  these consolidations. In each 
case, our interviews lasted about one and one-half hours and covered the 
history of mergers at that institution and in the state as a whole. All of the 
institutions that we approached agreed to speak with us. 
Table 1.6 gives a brief summary of each consolidation. The table shows 
the number of beds in each of the hospitals in 1980 and 1994 and provides 
an overview of the rationale for the merger. The mergers that we  examine 
represent a large share of the Massachusetts hospital industry. In 1980, for 
example, these institutions accounted for 23 percent of the state’s 25,005 
hospital beds in acute care facilities. 
1.6.1  Partners Health Care 
The Partners merger, agreed to in 1993, was the most important hospital 
consolidation in Massachusetts, if not the country, at the time. The merger 
brought together Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Wom- 
en’s  Hospital, two of  the five leading downtown teaching hospitals (the 
others were  Beth Israel, New England Medical Center, and Boston Uni- 
versity Medical Center). The merger sent shock waves throughout the rest 
of the market. Indeed, a fair part of the subsequent merger activity in the 
Boston area was a response to the Partners merger. 
The first thing to note about this merger, as shown in figure 1.7, is that 
Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital are 
not near each other. Massachusetts General Hospital is close to downtown 
Boston, while Brigham and Women’s Hospital is located in the Longwood 
Medical  Area,  a  dense  concentration  of  hospitals  near  the  Boston- 
Brookline border. The two hospitals are located three miles apart, a drive 
of perhaps twenty minutes. Thus, complete integration is not the goal of 
the merger. The only way  that would  be feasible would be to move the 
operations from one facility over to the other. 
The Partners merger is primarily a merger for network creation. At one 
level, the new institution is so prestigious that most insurers virtually can- 
not afford not to contract with it. This improves substantially Partners’ 
bargaining position with insurers. At another level, Partners has a strategy 
of affiliating with many physician groups in the periphery as well as setting 
up local ambulatory clinics in suburban areas, to extend the hospitals’ 
patient base. 
Having a combined institution makes it easier to engage in this practice, 
in part because the financial resources of the combined institution  are BOSTON 
Hospitals 
Unaffiliated 
o  Partners 
x  CareGroup  0 LenudShamrckHosptal 
Boston Medical Center 
+  CambridgelSomerviIle 
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much greater. Indeed, this strategy was aided by the fact that, prior to the 
merger, the two hospitals had primarily  drawn  patients  from  different 
parts of the city (Brigham and Women’s to the north; Massachusetts Gen- 
eral to the south), so that market share among the two hospitals was com- 
plementary. 
Part of the Partners merger is also for economies of scale, but these are 
largely administrative savings. For example, there are goals of consolidat- 
ing the information services departments, as well as human services and 
building and construction. The lack of full clinical integration is not par- 
ticularly surprising given the physical distance between the two institu- 
tions. But even the services that might be consolidated are not being con- 
solidated. For example, Massachusetts General Hospital went ahead with 
its plans to build a new obstetrics unit after the merger, even though Brig- 
ham and Women’s has perhaps the preeminent obstetrics unit in the coun- 
try. This was seen as some evidence that the merger between these institu- 
tions is more difficult than had been thought originally. 
Finally, as is relatively obvious, the Partners merger was not a merger 
for closure. The current combined institution is financially strong, even 
stronger than the hospitals themselves expected. Part of the reason  for 
that may be that the new network has been successful in increasing their 
customer base even in an overall declining market. The continued financial 
strength has put little pressure on Partners to close or consolidate  any 
services. This does not mean  that the hospitals have not reduced  their 
scale. Table 1.6 shows that between 1980 and 1994, the two hospitals com- 
bined reduced their bed capacity by 8 percent. This is not nearly as large 
as many other reductions, but it illustrates that even the most powerful 
hospitals in the market realized the need to downsize. 
1.6.2  CareGroup 
CareGroup is the result  of  a three-way merger between Pathways- 
which was Deaconess Hospital’s fledgling network-Beth  Israel Hospital 
and Mount Auburn Hospital. Beth Israel and the Deaconess were perhaps 
hospitals number three and four in the Boston market prior to the consoli- 
dations. Geographically, Beth Israel and the Deaconess are right next to 
each other in the Longwood area (in fig. 1.7, they are the two X’s directly 
north of Brigham and Women’s Hospital). Mount Auburn (also indicated 
with an X) is in Cambridge, to the northwest and across the Charles River 
from the two central hospitals. 
Beth Israel and the Deaconess had each held out hope of affiliating in 
some way  with either Massachusetts General Hospital or Brigham and 
Women’s Hospital prior to the Partners merger, and the hospitals spent 
the three years after that shock trying to solidify their positions as power- 
ful Boston area teaching hospitals. 
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Group. The first is  the integration of  Deaconess and Beth Israel. Beth 
Israel and the Deaconess are going to become one institution. The name 
has been changed to the Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital; they are appoint- 
ing only one service chief for each department; and they are going to phys- 
ically relocate parts of the two institutions to combine activities such as 
emergency rooms, obstetrics, and so forth. Indeed, the hospitals have gone 
so far as to plan a bridge to connect the two facilities. Full consolidation 
may take several years, but the hospitals envision a single, unified institu- 
tion. This part of  the merger appears to be for economies of  scale: the 
hospitals envision large cost savings from eliminating duplicative services. 
The second factor involved is the network that the combined institution 
is  forming. This is the primary rationale for keeping the other (smaller) 
hospitals with Beth Israel Deaconess. Mount Auburn and New England 
Baptist (one of the former Pathways members) are the more substantial 
of these other hospitals, but as table 1.6 shows Deaconess and Beth Israel 
as a combined institution dwarf the other members of the network. Several 
of the other hospitals (they are outside the map boundaries of fig.  1.7) 
will, in all likelihood, survive as acute care facilities; it is  generally less 
expensive to provide routine care outside of the major downtown center. 
The future of the smaller suburban hospitals in areas where demand has 
fallen substantially, however, is more perilous. 
Table 1.6 shows the extent to which CareGroup has already reduced its 
size. In 1980, the hospitals making up CareGroup actually would have 
been larger than Partners. By  1994, however, the combined institution is 
smaller, having cut a quarter of their inpatient beds. 
CareGroup’s strategy of maintaining suburban hospitals contrasts with 
the  Partners  strategy of  affiliating with  doctors  but  not  hospitals. Of 
course, if there is only one local hospital, having affiliated with either the 
doctors or the hospital is equivalent to having affiliated with both. But 
more generally, there is a debate about the right strategy for interaction of 
the powerful, downtown hospitals and the weaker, suburban communities 
that these two strategies reflect. 
1.6.3  Boston Medical Center 
Boston Medical Center is the result of a merger between Boston City 
Hospital and Boston University Hospital. As with the Deaconess-Beth 
Israel merger, University Hospital and Boston City Hospital are physically 
adjacent to each other, making it feasible for the two institutions to com- 
bine. Figure 1.7 shows the two hospitals isolated in east-central Boston. 
The primary reason for the merger appears to be economies of scale. It 
was  clear to everyone involved that with the reduction in inpatient de- 
mand, there was no need for two large hospitals located in that part of 
town. Because the projected size of two scaled-down hospitals would be 
too small to operate efficiently, merging was the only real option. Table 32  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
1.6 shows the extent to which the two hospitals had already reduced their 
capacity prior to the merger. By  1994, the institutions had cut 34 percent 
of their inpatient beds. The new hospital expects to shrink even more. The 
likely outcome is that the new, combined institution will have half as many 
beds as the two hospitals together had just fifteen years ago. 
Boston City Hospital and Boston University Hospital were synergistic 
in some ways, helping to ease the merger. Boston City Hospital had rela- 
tionships with community health centers, which meant access to patients. 
University Hospital never had much affiliation with primary care prac- 
tices. Surprisingly for a public hospital, Boston City Hospital was in good 
financial shape, due in large part to generous payments by  the state for 
Medicaid and care for the uninsured. University Hospital, on the other 
hand, was a private institution, which provided Boston City Hospital a 
way to remove itself from the controls of city government. 
Boston City Hospital and University Hospital had been de facto inte- 
grated for several years before the merger. They shared medical staff for 
at least three years prior to the merger, and the administrative positions 
had been merged through attrition for several years as well, in anticipation 
of the consolidation. 
The only real problem with the merger was the cultural issues over ac- 
cess for the poor and treatment of the public workers. The workers were 
largely ignored and the merger was approved despite their objections. The 
access issue was really a nonissue, as for now the new hospital intends to 
continue the policy of the old City Hospital, particularly if the city money 
continues to flow in. 
The two hospitals are currently in the process of merging all services 
into one institution. They are actually planning to close down some of the 
buildings (the hospitals are a mix of excellent new facilities and decaying 
older ones) as the institution shrinks. 
1.6.4  MetroWest-Columbia/HCA 
MetroWest is a story of two mergers. First there was a merger between 
two small, financially troubled  hospitals,  Frdmingham Union and Leo- 
nard Morse (Natick), that went very wrong. Second there is the purchase 
of the resulting hospital by Columbia/HCA, the largest for-profit hospital 
chain in the country. 
MetroWest was created in 1991 by a merger of Leonard Morse Hospital 
in Natick  and  Framingham  Union  Hospital  in  Framingham  (the two 
towns are adjacent, west of  Boston). This merger was largely a form of 
closure. It was clear to everyone associated with the hospitals that the 
Framingham-Natick market was not big enough to support two hospitals. 
The strategy employed by  Framingham was to wait for Natick to close, 
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companies to exclude Leonard Morse. Leonard Morse’s strategy was to 
beg for a merger, which ultimately took place. 
The merger was unsuccessful. Part of the difficulty was cultural. Fram- 
ingham  Union  was  the  teaching  hospital  with  the  star doctors,  while 
Leonard Morse was the friendly community hospital where the doctors 
paid attention to their patients. Framingham ignored Leonard Morse after 
the merger. The physical facility fell into disrepair and the services disap- 
peared. The Natick community was upset, and the local outcry to save 
Leonard Morse hospital helped to bring about a change of management. 
Beyond the cultural issues, the financial health of the new hospital dete- 
riorated. The hospitals continued to lose patients and were in need of capi- 
tal to improve the physical structure of the two institutions. The decision 
of the management was that the two hospitals would not be able to survive 
alone. An outside partner would be needed to provide capital and access 
to favorable insurance contracts. 
As a result, MetroWest was sold to Columbia/HCA. Before that, Metro- 
West was offered to the other major players in the Boston market, but 
Columbia was the only hospital that would guarantee to keep both facili- 
ties open. The deal allowed each of the institutions, and the hospital as a 
whole, to survive. Columbia benefited by  getting a foothold in the Bos- 
ton area. 
Since the takeover, MetroWest has done better financially. The turn- 
around in performance under ColumbidHCA is in part a result of cost 
cutting and in part a result of  converting inpatient facilities into more 
profitable services. The Leonard Morse building, for example, has transi- 
tional care units (TCUs), rehabilitation units, and a child psychology facil- 
ity. TCUs are a way  for hospitals to increase Medicare reimbursement.’ 
The result of all of this is that the Leonard Morse facility has almost no 
unused space in the hospital even though it has seen its patient base de- 
cline substantially. 
1.6.5  AtlantiCare 
AtlantiCare is the story of a town struggling to preserve local, acute- 
care hospital services. The city of Lynn, a poor, working class community 
in the North Shore section of  the Boston area, once had two hospitals: 
Union Hospital, which is where the current AtlantiCare hospital is, and 
Lynn Hospital. Like MetroWest, the two hospitals were more related by ge- 
ography than culture. Union was more suburban while Lynn was an inner- 
city hospital, even though the two are within three miles of each other. 
7. A patient admitted to the hospital with a hip fracture, for example, will be treated in 
the hospital unit and the hospital will receive a diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment. 
Afterward, the patient may be transferred to the rehabilitation unit, and the hospital is paid 
a per-diem rate for care. 34  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
In the mid-l980s, it became clear that two institutions could not survive 
in the city. The obvious solution was to consolidate hospital services into 
the nicer facility (Union Hospital); the Lynn Hospital structure was old 
and  substantially depreciated.  The  merger  was  predominately one for 
closure. 
The merger was not handled well politically, however, and the town es- 
sentially forced the hospitals to consolidate in the poor facility. The result 
was  an exodus of  patients and doctors to nearby Salem Hospital. The 
hospitals learned the hard way that patients are attached to their doctors 
more than their hospital, and that small community hospitals cannot force 
doctors or their patients to stay. 
Eventually, the hospital relocated to the good facility at Union, but by 
then a great deal of damage had been done. For example, obstetrics and 
pediatrics, which had fled for Salem Hospital from the old facility, never 
returned to the new facility. 
It is now clear that even the combined institution cannot survive in the 
new  marketplace. The hospital  has  cut  its costs,  but  that  will  not  be 
enough. The key  to survival in  the long run  is  access to patients. The 
North Shore as a whole has a substantial oversupply of beds, and Atlanti- 
Care cannot offer insurers the full-service hospital they desire. Without 
an  additional  merger,  AtlantiCare  is  almost  certain  to close.  Indeed, 
AtlantiCare has tried to merge with each of  the networks of the North 
Shore: the Salem group (which is affiliated with Partners), Beverly,  and 
Lahey (a doctor’s hospital in Burlington). None of these have worked out. 
1.6.6  Summary 
Our case studies document all three roles for mergers. In many cases, 
mergers are a way  of  facilitating or substituting for closure. MetroWest 
and AtlantiCare are prime examples of this. In one case, the merger facili- 
tated closure (AtlantiCare); in the other case, the merger substituted for 
closure (MetroWest). Fundamentally, however, the two examples are more 
similar than they are different. The stereotype of this type of consolidation 
is a smaller hospital in a metropolitan area or the suburban area just sur- 
rounding a metropolitan area where demand is falling. In these markets, 
there is  generally an oversupply of  hospital beds and patients have the 
ability to move across institutions. Some form of closure is often the result. 
Our case studies also show the potential  role of  economies of scale, 
particularly when  neighboring hospitals merge. Hospitals  can combine 
two service staffs into one at the administrative level or all the way down 
to moving departments across facilities. Economies of scale are most im- 
portant for Boston Medical Center and Beth Israel Deaconess, both of 
which are consolidating to operate more efficiently. Unfortunately, both 
mergers are too new to know much about how successful they will be in 
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But perhaps most strongly, the mergers show the growing regionaliza- 
tion of medical care delivery. The Boston area is building up several large 
provider networks: Partners, CareGroup, Boston Medical Center, Lahey, 
and ColumbidHCA (if it enters the city). Each network will be affiliated 
with suburban physicians and potentially hospitals. 
Columbia was recently dealt a blow in its attempts to enter the Boston 
hospital market when New England Medical Center, the last remaining 
unaffiliated, major  teaching hospital  downtown decided to merge with 
Lifespan, a Rhode Island not-for-profit hospital group associated with the 
Brown University  Medical School. Columbia’s potential entry into the 
Boston market was a source of concern for all of the hospitals with whom 
we  spoke, and all had assumed that New England Medical Center was the 
most likely target. With New England Medical Center having merged, it 
is less likely that Columbia will be able to establish a dominant position 
among the downtown teaching hospitals in  Boston. Columbia will  no 
doubt continue to be a major source of concern to the other Boston hospi- 
tals as it decides how or whether it will enter the market. 
Most of the consolidations we examine have network creation as one of 
the goals, if not the central goal. Network creation is valuable to the hospi- 
tals both because it ensures access to primary care physicians and their 
patients and because it gives them more leverage in bargaining with in- 
surers. 
The five potential networks in the Boston area is likely too many, how- 
ever. The networks that are already established employ predatory strategy 
toward the other networks, and some are in financial trouble. If inpatient 
demand continues to fall, financial difficulties will  increase and further 
consolidation is likely. This has been the experience in markets where con- 
solidation is more advanced than it is in Boston, such as California and 
Minneapolis. A common conjecture is that there will  eventually emerge 
roughly three networks in  Boston, each with its own group of  primary 
care physicians, specialists, and insurance contracts. 
In principle, the provider networks that are being formed could turn 
into insurance companies, since they will have the inpatient facilities and 
physician base to do so. It is generally believed, however, that this is un- 
likely to occur, since hospital administrators do not know the insurance 
business and may fare poorly in it, and they would risk antagonizing insur- 
ers who they otherwise need to negotiate with. 
The future of medical care in the area thus appears to be  a few large 
insurers negotiating with a few large provider groups. This is quite a big 
difference from the older organization of medical care. There may  also 
be  a growing role of for-profit hospitals in the Massachusetts market, if 
Columbia/HCA becomes a major player in the Boston area. Columbia is 
thought to be advantaged because of its easier access to capital, because 
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less need to worry about care for the uninsured  than do not-for-profit 
hospitals. If the criterion for survival in the Boston health care market is 
the ability to survive for-profit entry, then fewer networks than five at the 
end is probably the right number. 
1.7  Are the Mergers Successful? 
For  many  hospitals,  particularly  the  smaller  ones,  the  question  of 
whether the mergers are successful is answered simply by noting whether 
the hospital has managed to remain open. For the big hospitals, such as 
those in Pathways or Partners, the question is harder. There are three indi- 
cators one can examine to measure the success of consolidations. First, 
the mergers have implications on the revenue side. The mergers for net- 
work creation are intended, partially, to increase revenues from insurance 
companies through increased bargaining  power. The data necessary for 
this sort of analysis are unavailable, although the anecdotal evidence from 
our interviews suggests that Partners and Pathways have been somewhat 
successful in improving their contracts. Examining this in more detail is a 
key issue for future research. 
The second indicator is reductions in costs. If these mergers move hospi- 
tals to their efficient scale, then one should expect a fall in average cost 
following the consolidations. That is perhaps the most direct implication 
of mergers for economies of scale; medical care should now be provided 
more efficiently. There is some evidence that the mergers are having a posi- 
tive effect on costs. Figure 1.8 shows the trend in real costs per adjusted 
admission in Massachusetts and in  the United  States as a whole since 
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Table 1.7  Annual Growth Rate of Real CostdAdmission (%) 
Years  Massachusetts  United States 
1970-80  4.0  4.8 
1980-85  4.4  5.9 
1985-90  3.0  4.9 
1990-95  1.6  2.8 
Source; American Hospital Association data. 
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Fig. 1.9  AtlantiCare and MetroWest-costs  per adjusted admission relative to the 
rest of Massachusetts in years around their mergers 
affected more by managed care than have most areas, and if managed care 
is one of the primary driving forces behind mergers for economies of scale, 
we  should expect greater cost reductions there. This is indeed the case. 
Massachusetts has long had higher medical costs than the nation  as a 
whole, but over the last fifteen years costs have been falling relative to the 
rest of the country. This is particularly true in the last decade. In the 1980s, 
cost growth in Massachusetts was below growth in the nation as a whole 
by 0.8 percentage points. Between 1985 and 1995, the differential has been 
about 1.5 percentage points. 
Of course, what we would like to look at are the cost changes before and 
after particular mergers we can identify. We are hampered in this effort by 
the fact that several of the mergers are very recent and thus the potential 
cost reductions would not have taken place. Two of our mergers are more 
complete than the others: MetroWest and AtlantiCare. Figure 1.9 shows 
the hospitals’ combined real costs per adjusted admission in the years 
leading up to and after their respective mergers. Year zero is normalized 
as the year in which the merger took place: 1985 for AtlantiCare and 1991 38  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
for MetroWest. In each case, we  scale costs by  the average costs in the 
state as a whole. 
There is some evidence that the mergers did lead to cost savings. In the 
AtlantiCare merger, the time of the merger is likely not the time when cost 
reduction began, since there were several years of difficulty over the ulti- 
mate location of the combined institution. Indeed, the cost reductions ap- 
pear to come several years later. MetroWest experienced a drop in costs 
after their merger as well. It will be important to follow the effects of the 
more recent mergers over the next several years to estimate the degree of 
cost savings. 
The third indicator of merger success is the allocation of customers. 
One characteristic of the recent consolidations has been the outreach of 
the big city hospitals into the suburbs, through either the integration of 
neighborhood clinics or the purchase of neighborhood hospitals. A down- 
town hospital that purchases a hospital in a suburb should expect to see 
an increase in its share of patients from that suburb who go downtown for 
hospital care. 
The most natural test of this hypothesis is the Pathways network. Dea- 
coness purchased three suburban hospitals while creating Pathways: Ay- 
er’s Nashoba Community Hospital in 1993, Needham’s Glover Memorial 
Hospital in 1994, and Waltham/Weston Hospital in 1995. Table 1.8 shows 
the Deaconess’s share of hospital admissions from the towns of Ayer, Need- 
ham, and Walthafleston. If network creation is successful, then Dea- 
coness should attract a higher percentage of the hospital admissions in the 
peripheral towns, particularly those patients that go downtown for care. 
The Walthafleston  acquisition probably occurred too late to have an 
impact on the admission rates in  1995, and it is therefore not surprising 
that there is very little movement of patients toward Deaconess relative to 
its principal downtown competitors. It is perhaps also the case in Need- 
ham that the acquisition has not had enough time to adjust admission 
patterns. If behavior has adjusted as much as it ultimately will, then the 
story is not very good for network creation; Deaconess’s share of patients 
has actually fallen. The Nashoba acquisition looks to be more successful. 
Deaconess has gone from a nonentity in the Ayer hospital market to the 
leading downtown hospital presence, even if it is only 2.6 percent of the 
market. 
Even if  the downtown  hospital does not succeed in attracting more 
patients,  the alliance can be successful from the local perspective  if  it 
strengthens the local hospital. Tables 1.9 and  1.10 show where patients 
from Ayer and Needham respectively are admitted to the hospital. In both 
cases, the hospitals that merged with Deaconess have seen their market 
power improve. In the case of Ayer,  Nashoba’s gain seems to have come 
from taking patients from the other large regional hospitals rather than 
from large, downtown hospitals. Table 1.8  Changes in Market Share (1988-95)  in  Pathways Suburbs 
Deaconess  Massachusetts General  Brigham and Women’s  Beth Israel 
Market Share  Hospital Market Share  Market Share  Market Share 
(“4  (”/I  (“4  (“4 




Ayer  0.29  2.63  2.34  0.49  0.95  0.46  1.85  2.11  0.26  0.88  0.53  -0.35 
Needham  2.41  1.99  -0.42  3.00  2.89  -0.11  11.38  10.34  -1.04  5.44  5.75  0.32 
Waltham  0.77  1.33  0.56  2.51  3.02  0.51  5.36  5.12  -0.25  1.74  2.57  0.83 
Weston  2.26  2.58  0.32  10.57  10.91  0.34  12.38  13.41  1.03  7.14  7.66  0.52 
Source: Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission. 
aNashoba Community Hospital purchased in 1993. 
bGlover  Hospital purchased in 1994. 
‘Waltham-Weston Hospital purchased in 1994. 40  Jason R.  Barro and David M. Cutler 
Table 1.9  Hospital Admissions from Ayer,  1988,1995 
Hospital 
Market Share  Number of 
(“m  Admissions 






Brigham and Women’s 
Waltham-Weston” 
Massachusetts General Hospital 
N.E. Baptist Hospital” 
Beth Israel Hospital 
41.93  43.31 
26.85  20.76 
9.53  6.11 
5.84  4.00 
0.29  2.63 
1.85  2.11 
0.00  1.16 
0.49  0.95 
0.49  0.74 

































Source: Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission 
aThis hospital is a member of Pathways. 
Table 1.10  Hospital Admissions from Needham, 1988, 1995 
Market Share  Number of 
(YO)  Admissions 
Hospital  1988  1995  Change  1988  1995 
Glover Hospital“  38.83  42.21 
Newton-Wellesley  18.38  20.90 
Brigham and Women’s  11.38  10.34 
Massachusetts General Hopsital  3.00  2.89 
St. Elizabeth’s  2.92  2.23 
Deaconess”  2.41  1.99 
N.E. Baptist Hospital”  2.07  1.54 









1,371  1,594 
649  788 
402  390 
192  217 
106  109 
103  84 
58  75 
73  58 
Source: Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission. 
This hospital is a member of Pathways. 
1.8  Conclusions 
Hospital consolidations in Massachusetts have resulted primarily from 
the pressure imposed on the hospital market by the rise of managed care 
and changes in technology that reduced the demand for inpatient care. 
The reduction in demand is manifest in three ways: the need to close, the 
desire for economies of scale, and the value of health care networks. 
Consolidation in the medical care marketplace is likely to fundamen- 
tally change the relations between insurers and providers. The old medical 
system was one where insurers had little power and providers operated at 
a local level. The new  system will have several large insurers bargaining Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace in Massachusetts  41 
hard with large networks of providers. A widely expressed view is that by 
the end of the decade, the Boston area will have been transformed from a 
market with near fifty hospitals to a market with essentially three to four 
regional networks of doctors, downtown, and local hospitals. 
There are three issues that the consolidation of medical care raises that 
will ultimately determine the success of this transformation. The first is 
the effect of these consolidations on the level and growth rate of medical 
costs. Consolidation seems destined to reduce the level of medical spend- 
ing. Much of medical costs are the return on past investment (for example, 
specialist physicians), and the new medical system seems likely to elimi- 
nate these rents. The long-run driver of medical costs is new technology, 
however (Aaron 1991; Newhouse 1992; Cutler and McClellan 1996), and 
it is less certain what effect consolidation will have on the nature of techno- 
logical change. 
The second issue is the effect of the increased market power of hospitals 
on the costs ultimately faced by patients. The increased bargaining posi- 
tion of hospitals should shift some rents from their contracts with doctors 
and insurance companies toward the hospitals. This may raise the premi- 
ums individuals pay for insurance, depending on how competitive the in- 
surance industry is. The antitrust implications of mergers are not entirely 
clear, but essentially all proposed  mergers have been approved by  state 
and federal regulators. 
The third issue is how the new system will deal with the uninsured and 
underinsured. A hallmark of the noncompetitive medical care system was 
the extraordinary amount of  “uncompensated care” it provided to the 
poor. Of course, the care was ultimately paid for in the form of higher 
prices to governments and the privately insured. As public and private 
payers become increasingly reluctant to subsidize these activities, the care 
for those unable to afford insurance may suffer. Medical care consolida- 
tion may bring issues of equity and social values to the front even as they 
push worries over medical costs to the rear. 
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Comment  Paul M. Healy 
Overview of Study 
This study examines factors underlying the high frequency of mergers 
and acquisitions in the hospital industry during the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Based on their analysis of consolidations in the state of  Massachusetts, 
the authors conclude that mergers were a response to the dramatic decline 
in demand for hospital beds after 1980. By  1994 demand for beds in the 
state had fallen to 67 percent of 1980 demand. This trend is expected to 
continue, with demand forecasted to decline to 50 percent  of  the  1980 
level by  2000. 
The authors trace the decline in demand for hospital beds to changes in 
health insurance and to improved medical technology. In the early 1980s, 
private managed care insurers as well  as public insurers (Medicare and 
Medicaid) began paying providers on a per-patient basis, rather than on 
a fee-for-service basis. These fee changes gave  health  providers greater 
incentive to economize on health costs and hospital stays. In addition, 
new medical technologies enabled procedures that would formerly have 
required a hospital stay to be performed on an outpatient basis. 
The authors hypothesize that the sharp decline in hospital demand pro- 
vided three motivations for mergers: to facilitate hospital closures or bed 
reductions, to enable small hospitals to survive by  consolidating to take 
advantage of economies of scale, and to help providers create networks to 
Paul M. Healy  is the MBA  Class of 1949 Professor of  Business Administration at Har- 
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improve their bargaining power with insurers. The evidence provided in 
the paper, which is derived from aggregate hospital data and individual 
firm case studies, is consistent with all three explanations. For example, 
the field studies suggest that the consolidation of Union and Lynn Hospi- 
tals occurred to reduce bed capacity in Lynn, whereas the merger of Mas- 
sachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s  Hospitals was aimed at 
increasing efficiency through economies of scale and creating a powerful 
network of providers in the Boston area. 
The paper has several very positive features. First, by  providing evi- 
dence on the economic forces underlying hospital mergers, closures, and 
network creation, it can inform the public policy debate on the merits of 
hospital  mergers, both  in  Massachusetts  and  elsewhere in  the  United 
States. Second, by  using both aggregate data and individual firm case 
studies, the authors are able to provide stronger evidence on hospital con- 
solidations than would be possible using each of these sources alone. The 
aggregate data provide evidence on the broad changes taking place in the 
industry, whereas the field studies provide evidence on management moti- 
vations for hospital mergers. 
I anticipate that this paper will stimulate additional research on health 
care provider consolidation, particularly in light of the ongoing public 
policy debate on the economic implications of provider mergers. I there- 
fore focus my  comments on areas where such research could be directed: 
further examination of reasons for mergers and additional empirical tests. 
Further Examination of Reasons for Hospital Mergers 
The paper provides a useful overview of the major motives for hospital 
merger. However, each of the three explanations presented in  the paper 
merits additional consideration. 
Mergers to Close Hospitals 
Although the authors argue that mergers facilitate hospital closures or 
capacity declines, they provide relatively little explanation of  the forces 
that make mergers necessary to induce hospitals managers to downsize 
their facilities. Several explanations are plausible. First, target managers 
may be reluctant to voluntarily reduce hospital capacity either because of 
concern about their own job security or because of public pressure to keep 
community hospitals open. Alternatively, hospital managers may be reluc- 
tant to downsize if they believe that their competitors may downsize first, 
leaving their own firm as the industry survivor. For example, consider two 
competing hospitals of comparable size and operating efficiency that face 
a 50 percent  decline in demand. Each has an incentive to wait for the 
other to close, so that it can become the sole provider for the region. The 
optimal strategy for each provider may therefore be to avoid reducing ca- 44  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
pacity, even though demand is shrinking. By  agreeing to merge, the two 
eliminate this destructive private incentive and permit an orderly reduc- 
tion in capacity to take place within the region. 
The above explanations of merging as a form of facilitating closure have 
different empirical predictions. If mergers occur so that efficiently run hos- 
pitals can close or consolidate weaker operations, acquirers are likely to 
be hospitals that have already reduced their own bed capacity, whereas 
targets would not. Alternatively, if mergers arise to eliminate private incen- 
tives by hospitals in the same region to avoid downsizing, neither partner 
in the combination will have had to reduce its capacity prior to the merger, 
In addition, both merger partners would compete in the same geographic 
region. 
Mergers for Economies of Scale 
Hospitals may also merge to generate economies of scale. These arise if 
merging hospitals can reduce the cost of expensive equipment that is cur- 
rently not fully utilized or can reduce administrative personnel and nurs- 
ing and medical staff. As the authors note in the paper, “an average hospi- 
tal had a total budget of $100 million in 1994, of which approximately 50 
percent came from labor expenses. If a hospital could cut 10 percent of 
its labor force, it would save approximately 5 percent of total spending.” 
However, the evidence in table 1.1 suggests that economies in personnel 
may not be easy to achieve. Indeed, full-time hospital employment per 
bed is higher for larger hospitals than for smaller. Hospitals with fewer 
than one hundred beds have an average of  3.66 full-time employees per 
bed, compared to 5.58 for hospitals with more than three hundred beds. 
These data suggest that there may  actually be  diseconomies of scale for 
physicians, nurses, and other hospital employees, raising questions about 
the sources of economies of scale in hospital mergers. 
Mergers for Network Creation 
The third explanation for mergers provided in the paper-the  creation 
of area networks to increase bargaining power with insurers-raises  sev- 
eral questions. For example, what are the implications of the combinations 
for patients? At one level increased provider power is likely to increase the 
costs of health care for users.  However, this need not be  the case. For 
example, if  it is difficult for users to evaluate the quality of their health 
care, powerful providers may  counteract insurers’ incentives to increase 
profits by lowering health care quality. Many communities are increasingly 
wary of managed care insurers’ incentives to reduce the quality of care 
and have passed or proposed legislation to regulate insurers.’ It would be 
1. Regulations have been passed in at least twenty states to protect the rights of managed 
care patients. These regulations cover such issues as assuring managed care patients of conti- 
nuity of care and access to emergency services, specialists, and experimental procedures, as 
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interesting to examine whether these regulations are effective in main- 
taining health care quality, or whether the creation of powerful provider 
networks are more effective regulators of insurer incentives. 
Management’s justification of many of the largest recent hospital merg- 
ers on network grounds, rather than consolidation grounds, has an alter- 
native explanation to that provided in the paper. The authors note that by 
2000 the demand for hospital beds in Massachusetts is expected to fall by 
50 percent relative to its 1980 level, although the number of hospital beds 
has declined by only 25 percent. Considerable additional capacity reduc- 
tion is therefore likely to occur. Yet target and acquirer management ap- 
parently prefer to focus on creating provider networks rather than on mak- 
ing painful cuts in their own bed capacity. Is management simply avoiding 
making these difficult downsizing decisions? Certainly, there is casual evi- 
dence consistent with this hypothesis. For example, in January 1997, New 
England Medical Center (NEMC), a struggling nonprofit hospital in Bos- 
ton, was acquired by Lifespan (a Providence not-for-profit group affiliated 
with Brown University Medical School). Other bidders for the hospital 
included Columbia/HCA, the nation’s largest for-profit hospital company. 
Lifespan argued that the acquisition would help it create a strong regional 
network. The failure of Columbia to acquire NEMC was greeted with 
relief by all the major area groups, perhaps because Columbia would be 
more likely to reduce capacity at NEMC and to provide more cost compe- 
tition in the Boston hospital market. It remains to be seen whether these 
types of acquisitions provide the intended benefits or whether they have 
simply delayed inevitable capacity reductions. 
Additional Empirical Evidence on Mergers 
Because the data used in the study are relatively coarse, there remain 
opportunities to undertake additional empirical research on hospital con- 
solidations. For example, the evidence on reductions in hospital bed ca- 
pacity is based on the number of beds available in only two years (1 980 
and  1994) for both the aggregate tests and the case studies. These data 
are difficult to interpret since they do not provide evidence on changes in 
capacity before and after the merger. As a result it is not possible to assess 
whether mergers actually led to reductions in capacity, as hypothesized, 
or whether the observed reductions had already taken place prior to the 
mergers. To distinguish between these competing explanations, additional 
time-series data must be collected so that beds available at each hospital 
can be aligned in event time. 
Time-series data on hospital capacity will also provide insights into the 
characteristics of target and acquirer firms, and hence the forces that lead 
to consolidating acquisitions. For example, are acquisitions to reduce ca- 
pacity made by acquirers that have successfully downsized their own facil- 
ities? Have these acquirers taken  over and downsized other  providers’ 46  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
facilities? Are targets in these acquisitions firms that have been slow to 
reduce capacity? Alternatively, have both partners been unable to make 
reductions (perhaps because they want to be the survivor in their region)? 
Other ways to improve our understanding of the forces underlying ac- 
quisitions include examining the premerger characteristics of targets and 
acquirers. For example, if acquirers merge with providers that have been 
slow to reduce capacity, there are likely to be differences in operating effi- 
ciency for the two firms prior to acquisition. Data on operating costs per 
patient, operating costs per bed, and occupancy rates can show whether 
acquirers have lower costs per patient and costs per bed and higher oc- 
cupancy rates than target hospitals. Also, in areas where there is a mix of 
not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals, are acquirers more likely to be for- 
profits, where operating efficiency is viewed as more salient? 
It will also be interesting to examine data on postmerger performance 
for the combined firm. If mergers are justified as a means of developing 
economies of scale, are they followed by reductions in employees per pa- 
tient or employees per bed? Are there declines in capital, administrative, 
and operating costs per bed and/or per patient? Do mergers for the cre- 
ation of regional networks enable the merged firm to negotiate better deals 
with insurers, and thereby have higher revenue growth, higher operating 
margins, andlor higher market share than they would otherwise have had? 
Do they lead to increased patient occupancy rates? The authors provide 
some data on these effects, but they are relatively limited. There is scope 
for additional work on these areas, particularly given questions about the 
benefits of network mergers noted earlier. 
Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether the high frequency 
of hospital mergers in Massachusetts and the factors underlying these con- 
solidations are also evident in other parts of the country. Are mergers also 
popular in regions where hospital demand has not declined as rapidly as 
Massachusetts, perhaps because of offsetting population or demographic 
changes? Are there nonmerger responses to the decline in hospital demand 
in other regions? 
Summary 
In conclusion,  this paper  provides a fascinating first look at the re- 
sponses by  the hospital industry in Massachusetts to a dramatic decline 
in demand. The paper is innovative in its use of both aggregate industry 
and field study data to examine this topic. The observed consolidation of 
the industry through mergers and acquisitions raises a number of interest- 
ing follow-up questions. For example, do the mergers really cause reduc- 
tions in hospital beds? If so, what forces make mergers the most effective 
way for providers to reduce capacity? Do firms realize anticipated econo- 
mies of scale from mergers? How effective are network mergers in improv- Consolidation in the Medical Care Marketplace in Massachusetts  47 
ing providers’ bargaining power with insurers? Do these mergers permit 
providers to avoid costly downsizing? Answers to these questions are par- 
ticularly relevant given the public debate on the changing health industry 
landscape. 
Comment  Frank R. Lichtenberg 
Jason Barro and David Cutler have written a very insightful case study of 
a market undergoing enormous transitions. They document that in 1980, 
there were  108 acute care hospitals in Massachusetts. By  1994, 21  had 
closed (or ceased to operate as acute care hospitals) and another 56 had 
engaged in some kind of affiliation; only 3  1 “remained the same.” As they 
observe, the rapid structural change in the Massachusetts medical care 
marketplace is largely attributable to two major types-organizational  and 
technological-of  exogenous innovation in the delivery of health care. 
The major organizational innovation was (and continues to be) the re- 
placement of  traditional  fee-for-service health care by  “managed care.” 
Between 1976 and  1995, the fraction of the U.S. population  enrolled in 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs) increased more than sixfold, 
from 2.8 percent to 17.7 percent (Health, United States, 1995 [1996], table 
136). There was also a shift in the character of managed care: in  1976, 
staff, group, and network model HMOs accounted for almost all HMO 
enrollments, whereas by  1995, they accounted for only about one-fourth 
of enrollments.’ 
It is widely believed that people enrolled in HMOs are less likely to be 
admitted to hospitals than traditionally insured people who are similar in 
other (observable) respects2 Data from the 1992 National Hospital Am- 
bulatory Medical Care Survey-which  provides data on a large random 
sample of hospital outpatient department visits-are  consistent with this 
view.  Overall, the patient is admitted (as an inpatient) to the hospital in 
about  1.2 percent  of hospital outpatient visits. The probability that an 
HMO patient will be admitted to the hospital is about 0.6 percent lower 
than the probability that a fee-for-service patient will be admitted, control- 
ling for single year of age, sex, race, ethnicity, (ICD-9 two-digit) diagnosis, 
Frank R. Lichtenberg is the Courtney C. Brown Professor of Business at the Graduate 
School of Business of Columbia University and a research associate of the National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
1. By  1995, “individual practice associations” (IPAs), in which the HMO contracts with 
an association of physicians from various settings (solo and group practices), and “mixed” 
(IPNgroup) models accounted for the majority of enrollments. 
2. The admission rate may be lower, in part, because HMOs may place greater emphasis 
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geographic region, “fixed hospital effects,”  and a few other variables. In 
other words, the HMO patient is about 30  to 50 percent  less likely to be 
admitted  to the hospital, and this difference is highly statistically signifi- 
cant.’ This, of course, implies that the adoption and diffusion of the inno- 
vation known as managed care resulted in a sharp decline in the number 
of hospital admissions, which the authors do~ument.~ 
The time-series evidence-the  fact that the number of  hospitals was 
declining when managed care penetration  was increasing-is  certainly 
consistent with the hypothesis that the managed care revolution precipi- 
tated consolidation in the medical care marketplace. It would be nice to 
test this hypothesis econometrically using longitudinal data on various 
health care markets. Although managed care penetration has increased in 
all regions of the country, it has increased more rapidly in some regions 
than in others. In the west, for example, the fraction of the population 
enrolled in HMOs increased from 9.7 percent in 1976 to 29.0 percent in 
1995, whereas in the south it increased from 0.4 percent to 11.2 percent 
(Health, United States, 1995 [1996], table  136). Was the rate of hospital 
consolidation in the south during this period significantly lower than what 
it was in the west? 
Technological innovation was the second major cause of the decline in 
hospital utilization. One aspect of this alluded to by  the authors was the 
substitution  of  outpatient surgery for inpatient  surgery: the fraction of 
total surgeries performed on an outpatient basis increased from 16.4 per- 
cent in  1980 to 54.9 percent  in  1993.5  Another was the substitution of 
drugs for surgical treatment. In a recent paper (Lichtenberg 1996), I per- 
formed an econometric analysis of  the effect of changes in the quantity 
and type of pharmaceuticals prescribed by physicians in outpatient visits 
on rates of hospitalization, surgical procedure, mortality, and related vari- 
ables.  I  examined  the  statistical  relationship  across  diseases  between 
changes in outpatient pharmaceutical utilization and changes in inpatient 
3. In the 1991 National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey-a  random sample of outpa- 
tient visits to doctor offices-the  HMO hospitalization rate is also lower than the fee-for- 
service hospitalization rate (controlling for similar covariates), but the difference is statisti- 
cally insignificant. Patients visiting hospital outpatient departments tend to have lower in- 
comes than those visiting doctors’ offices, so this may indicate that managed care may limit 
hospitalization of  low income individuals to a greater extent. 
4. The difference between HMO and fee-for-service hospital admission rates may reflect 
a variety of factors, and may either overstate or understate the true “effect” of HMOs on 
hospitalization. One reason for overstatement is that exogenously healthier individuals may 
self-select for HMO coverage when they have a choice. On the other hand, as Laurence 
Baker and Martin Brown (1997) have hypothesized, there may be “spillovers” (e.g., “demon- 
stration” or “threat” effects) from HMO practices to fee-for-service practices; this would 
cause the difference in probabilities to understate the effect of HMOs. 
5. Health, United States, 1995 (1996), table 90. The outpatient share of  total surgeries 
increased most rapidly in small hospitals: 62.5 percent of surgeries performed  in  1993 in 
hospitals with fewer than one hundred beds were outpatient  surgeries, compared  to 47.0 
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care utilization and mortality during the period 1980-92.  I found that the 
number of hospital stays, bed days, and surgical procedures declined most 
rapidly for those diagnoses with the greatest increase in the total number 
of drugs prescribed and the greatest change in the distribution of drugs, 
by molecule. The estimates implied that an increase of one hundred pre- 
scriptions is  associated with  1.48 fewer hospital admissions, 16.3 fewer 
hospital days, and 3.36 fewer inpatient surgical procedures. Greater quan- 
tity and novelty of pharmaceuticals  had  a negative impact on average 
length of stay in hospitals, as well as on the number of hospital stays. The 
average number of inpatient procedures performed per stay increased more 
slowly for diagnoses with higher growth in drug quantity and novelty. 
Barro and Cutler attempt to assess the consequences as well as the causes 
of hospital consolidation, but their ability to do so is limited by  the re- 
centness of most of the mergers and alliances and by incomplete data on 
hospital inputs, outputs,  and prices. In principle, hospital mergers may 
be profitable because they enable the hospitals to reduce costs (increase 
productivity), raise prices, or both. As the authors note, cost savings are 
most likely to be realized in administrative departments (e.g., information 
services, human resources, and building and construction). My research 
(1992)  on mergers and acquisitions in  the manufacturing  sector of  the 
economy is  consistent with this view.  I found that mergers had a much 
greater impact on the employment of administrators than they did on pro- 
duction workers, and that reductions in administrative costs accounted for 
almost half of the productivity gains associated with mergers. 
Unfortunately, measuring the productivity of  hospitals is much more 
difficult than measuring the productivity of  manufacturing plants  (and 
even that is subject to pitfalls!). Costs per admission and similar resource- 
intensity measures may be misleading because of substantial heterogeneity 
in case mix and severity of illness. The authors note that “most research 
suggests that the pool of patients being admitted to hospitals is sicker now 
than it used to be,”  so that the increase in deflated costs per admission 
overstates the true rate of  cost increase. The data on AtlantiCare’s and 
MetroWest’s relative costs per adjusted admission presented in figure 1.9 
suggest that these costs tend to decline following the merger, but there is 
also evidence of a downward trend premerger, which may simply continue 
(not accelerate) after consolidation. 
The authors argue that an important reason for a hospital to join a 
network of health care providers is to increase its bargaining power vis-a- 
vis large-scale purchasers of health services (managed care organizations 
and insurance companies). Consolidation may enable hospitals to charge 
higher prices and enhance their  “market power” in the face of  the in- 
creased monopsony power that large-scale purchasers have acquired. Pre- 
sumably due to lack of data, Barro and Cutler do not examine the behav- 
ior of  prices  of  hospital  services in relation to supplier consolidation; 50  Jason R. Barro and David M. Cutler 
hopefully they or others will do so in future research. According to Martin 
Gaynor (1997), the Federal Trade Commission has challenged several pro- 
posed hospital mergers on antitrust grounds, but it has not won any of 
these cases; the courts ruled that these mergers did not pose a threat to 
consumer welfare. 
Standard models of perfectly or monopolistically competitive industries 
imply that a contraction in demand will result in industry restructuring 
and a reduction in the equilibrium number of  “firms.” Barro and Cutler 
have done an excellent job of vividly describing both the main features 
and the nuances of that adjustment process in an actual, and very interest- 
ing, market. 
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